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Abstract
This paper investigates under which circumstances negotiating simultaneously over multiple issues
or assets helps reduce ine¢ ciencies due to the presence of asymmetric information. We nd that a
simultaneous negotiation over multiple assets that are substitutes reduces ine¢ ciencies. The e¤ect is
stronger if goods are heterogeneous, and in this case the ine¢ ciency can be eliminated altogether. When
assets are not substitutes ine¢ ciencies always prevail. We also study cases where co-ownership is possible
(partnerships), allowing for asymmetric distributions, general valuation functions and for multiple assets.
We show that e¢ cient dissolution is possible if all agents valuations at their types where gains of trade
are minimal are equal: For this to hold, the agent that most likely has the highest valuation for a given
asset should initially own a bigger share of that asset. We discuss implications of these ndings for the
design of partnerships and joint ventures. JEL classication codes: C72, D82, L14. Keywords: e¢ cient
mechanism design, multiple units, partnerships.
1. Introduction
Many important economic and political decisions are determined through negotiations. Negotiations de-
termine the terms of rm acquisitions,1 of mergers, and of labor contracts. They also play a key role for
international treaties, constitutional reforms, and dispute resolutions. There are usually multiple issues at
stake and often money also changes hands, as in the cases of M&As and labor contracts. We present a
general model of negotiations under incomplete information between individuals who are risk-neutral and
bargain over multiple issues. We allow for private information to be multidimensional and consider the
case of private values. An agents payo¤ from a given issues settlement is a function, not necessarily linear,
We are grateful to Mariagiovanna Baccara, Heski Bar-Isaac, Phil Reny and Balazs Szentes for useful discussions and
comments. We also beneted from comments of the audiences at Northwestern University, and at the University of Chicago.
y Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile, República 701, Santiago, Chile.; nicolasf@dii.uchile.cl;
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Email:vskreta@stern.nyu.edu
1Recent empirical work by Boone and Mulherin (2007) suggests that about half of company sales are performed via
negotiations.
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of his type. Our main objective is to identify the forces that result in the possibility (or impossibility) of
designing incentive compatible mechanisms where agents are willing to participate without coercion, and
that at the same time balance the budget and achieve e¢ cient outcomes.
An important economic insight is that the presence of asymmetric information seriously hinders the
ability of negotiating parties to achieve mutually benecial agreements. For this reason, asymmetric in-
formation is viewed as a serious form of transaction costs in Coases tradition. In a trading environment,
the seminal paper by Myerson and Satterwhaite (1983) shows that when gains from trade are uncertain,
no ex-post e¢ cient negotiation between a single seller and a single buyer exists. The work by Cramton,
Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) shows that in an environment where agents valuations of the good are
identically distributed, and the ownership is distributed in close to equal shares among partners, a reas-
signment can be done e¢ ciently, giving complete control to the partner with the highest ex-post valuation.
They conclude that similar property rights are a key factor in determining whether e¢ ciency is achievable
or not. This role of property rights has also been stressed in the context of public good settings by Neeman
(1999) and Schmitz (2002) among others.
In this paper we identify the exact role of initial property rights in avoiding ine¢ ciencies. More
importantly, we identify another key force that reduces the intensity of conict among the negotiating
parties: the simultaneous negotiation over di¤erent issues that are substitutes in the eyes of the agents.
We show under which circumstances this can ultimately help reduce or even eliminate the ine¢ ciencies.
There are many situations where negotiating parties have the option to put more than one issue on the
table at the same time. In multilateral trade negotiations thousands of issues are discussed simultaneously,
in complex mergers the ownership of many assets is on the table at the same time, etc. To x ideas, let
us look at the market for professional sports players. There the ownership of assets (players rights) is
determined via negotiations, which usually involve multiple players and cash. Each teams valuation for
a particular player is private information, players are heterogeneous across multiple characteristics and,
most importantly, present strong complementarities and substitutabilities with each other. All these facts
make them sometimes expendable for a team, but critical for the success of another one. Then, what are
the forces that determine whether they can be e¢ ciently allocated?
Lets rst consider the case of two teams negotiating over a single player, whose rights are owned by
one of them. From Myerson and Sattertwaite (1983) we know that ex-post e¢ cient trade is impossible.
But what if the seller owns, for instance, 2 forwards and has to bench one of them (so the marginal utility
for the second player is lower than for the rst)? These log-jams are quite common. Think, for example,
Barcelona in 2007 with Henry and EtoO. Can ine¢ ciencies be reduced if both players are negotiated
simultaneously? To what extent, and under which circumstances do simultaneous negotiations help reduce
ine¢ ciencies?
We rst note that negotiating simultaneously over multiple assets that exhibit substitutabilities reduces
ine¢ ciencies. The degree to which substitutabilities help depends crucially on whether assets are homoge-
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neous or heterogeneous. For homogeneous assets the degree of substitutability reduces ine¢ ciencies, but
does not solve the problem completely.2 However, for heterogeneous assets, substitutabilities may eliminate
ine¢ ciencies altogether. It is interesting to stress that in our set-up, this result requires the initial owner-
ship structure to be extreme, in the sense that one agent owns all the assets. If not, it is never possible
to achieve e¢ ciency. This nding contradicts conventional wisdom in the context of private values (which
stems from Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987)), that suggests that it is easier to achieve e¢ ciency if
property rights are more balanced.3 We end by pointing out that if assets are not substitutes ine¢ ciency
always prevails.
Going back to our example, our ndings suggest that in the presence of a log-jam, teams should negotiate
over players simultaneously instead of doing it consecutively. Putting multiple players on the table helps
to achieve e¢ ciency when they are substitutes and this e¤ect is stronger when they are heterogeneous,
which is very much the case in this market.
What happens when the ownership of players is non-exclusive? As sport acionados know, partial
ownership of players in soccer is quite common. European soccer teams often form partnerships consisting
of an upper division and a lower division team in order to acquire very young third world soccer players.
By doing so they avoid higher prices in the future. Co-ownership is convenient because at that point the
player is too young and inexperienced for the upper division team, but still useful for the other team.
While playing in the lower division he matures and becomes also useful for the other one.
Unfortunately, this strategy has often backred. Once the player develops and it is time to dissolve
the partnership and cash in, the teams often fail to reach agreement. The break-down of negotiations
sometimes forces a player even to miss a months of play, which leads to an enormous loss of value. This
was exactly the case of Luis Jiménez, a Chilean forward owned in equal shares by Fiorentina (rst division)
and Ternana (third division). Negotiations broke down for months, and only after a third team (Lazio)
stepped in and o¤ered cash in return for borrowing the player, was Ternana able to buy the remaining
half shares, allowing the player to continue his career. What was the problem? If property rights were
equal, shouldnt the intuition from Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) hold and ex-post e¢ ciency
be possible? Was there any better way to structure the partnership?
We study a general partnership environment with asymmetric distributions, general valuation functions
and multiple assets. In order to focus on the ownership issue, we abstract from substitutabilities and
complementarities. We show that e¢ cient dissolution is possible if all agentsvaluation of an asset at their
critical type4 are equal, that is i(vi ) = j(v

j ). For the standard case of linear valuations, this condition
reduces to vi = v

j and, for symmetric distributions (as in Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987)),
2 In the language of Myerson-Sattertwaite, it reduces the subsidy a broker should put in order to have existence of an
ex-post e¢ cient mechanism that is incentive compatible and satises the voluntary participation constraints
3Jehiel and Panzer (2006) show that extreme ownership helps in a setting with one-sided incomplete information and
interdependent values.
4This is the type where gains from trade are minimized.
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to equal property rights. However, for asymmetric environments we show that the property rights that
guarantee i(vi ) = j(v

j ) can be extremely unequal.
5 Moreover, we show that agents that most likely
have the highest valuation, should initially own a bigger share of the asset.6 This insight has important
implications for many situations, some of which we describe below.
In Luis Jiménezcase, the problem might just have been the equality in ownership shares. Fiorentina
was much more likely to value the player more (playing in Serie A there is more at a stake) but owned
only 50% of the shares. The same could be said in general about other joint-ventures. The ones likely to
benet the most ex-post (for example, the ones with more marketing muscle) should own bigger shares of
the project. If this is not true, it may be impossible to nd a mechanism that transfers control e¢ ciently
to one of the participants.
Our ndings can also shed light on the problem of e¢ cient allocation of new technologies among various
rms. This is of great economic relevance because, for technologies, the opportunity cost of misallocation
is very high. In a patent race, initial property rights can be seen as the probability that each agent will
win the race if no partnership is developed. Our previous result indicates that to have e¢ cient trade, the
rms that are better at inventing (that is the bigger initial share ri) should also have higher capacity
of developing applications after the technology is discovered (a better distribution of valuations). This is
often not true, as can be seen in the case of the technology used in Blackberry mobile devices. Research
in Motion (RIM), the developer of Blackberry, did not own the right for the technology, and fought costly
litigation for more than 3 years with NTP. NTP owned the rights for the technology, but it is primarily
a patent owning company, with no ability to directly develop products and prot from the patents.7 Our
results suggest that in order for e¢ ciency to prevail, it must be the case that rms that are more likely
to value the invention more, are also the ones more likely to develop it. This could provide a rational
for the integration of research departments into big rms. Integration may help avoid lost prots due to
transaction costs associated with incomplete information.
Summarizing, we show that when the initial ownership structure is exclusive, negotiating simultaneously
over multiple issues is a way to reduce the conict of interest if some issues are substitutes. It is easier
to achieve e¢ ciency because the level of necessary transfers drops, sometimes even to zero for the case for
heterogeneous goods. For the case of partial ownership, we show that property rights play a crucial role
but not in the way it had been initially postulated. What matters for e¢ ciency is that agents with a higher
probability of high valuations must own a big initial share of the partnership.
5For linear environments, the condition reduces to vi = v

j ; which was discovered independently by Che (2006).
6 In relation to Schweizer (2006), we not only state that there exist property rights that guarantee the e¢ cient dissolution
of asymmetric partnership, but we also identify that the critical condition is that i(vi ) = j(v

j ), which allows us to infer
exactly how the properties rights should be. The relation between property rights and valuations was discovered independently
by Kuribko (2005) in the context of dynamic partnerships.
7There is extensive press coverage of this lawsuit. For a sample see "Detractors of BlackBerry See Trouble Past Patents."
The New York Times, March 6, 2006.
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This paper relates to the literature on e¢ cient mechanism design, where the seminal papers are the
ones by Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973). A signicant fraction of the literature on e¢ cient
mechanism design, is concerned with the design of e¢ cient trading mechanisms. The seminal contribution
here is Myerson and Sattertwaite (1983). Important extensions, with methodological developments from
which we borrow extensively, are in the papers by Makowski and Mezzetti (1993,1994), Williams (1999),
Krishna and Perry (2000) and Schweizer (2006).
This paper is also related to the literature on partnerships, which stems from Cramton, Gibbons and
Klemperer (1987). The analysis of interdependent valuations with one-sided incomplete information is
in Jehiel and Pauzner (2004). More recent contributions are the papers by Ornelas and Turner (2007)
and Ferreira, Ornelas and Turner (2007), that separate the issue of ownership from control, and Brusco,
Lopomo, Robinson and Viswanathan (2007) who examine an interdependent value environment and allow
for non-cash payments.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the general model and results. In section 3
we examine the role of simultaneous negotiations in achieving e¢ ciency. In section 4 we study the role of
property rights and its relation to the distribution of valuations. We present our conclusions in section 5.
2. The model
There are N risk-neutral agents negotiating over some issues. An outcome z 2 Z species how the issues
are resolved. We take Z to be nite. Agent is payo¤ from outcome z depends on his type vi = (v1i ; ::::; v
k
i )
and it is denoted by zi (vi) . The vector vi is distributed on Vi = k2K [vki ; vki ] according to Fi; where
 1 < vki  vki < 1, for all k 2 K. We use F (v) = i2NFi(vi); where v 2 V = i2NVi and F i(v i) =
j 6=iFj(vj) where v i 2 V i = j 6=iVj . We assume throughout that the distribution F has a continuous
density function that is strictly positive everywhere.
Basic Denitions
By the revelation principle we know that any outcome that can be achieved by a bargaining procedure,
arises at a truth-telling equilibrium of a direct revelation game. Therefore we can without loss of generality
restrict attention to incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms. A direct revelation mechanism
(DRM), M = (p; x), consists of an assignment rule p : V  ! (Z) and a payment rule x : V  ! RN .
The assignment rule species the probability of each outcome for a given vector of reports. We denote
by pz(v) the probability that outcome z is implemented when the vector of reports is v. The payment rule
x species, for each vector of reports v, a vector of expected net transfers, one for each agent.
The interim expected utility of an agent of type vi when he participates and declares v0i is
Ui(vi; v
0
i; (p; x)) = Ev i
"X
z2Z
[pz(v0i; v i)
z
i (vi)] + xi(v
0
i; v i)
#
:
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If negotiations break down because of agent is unwillingness to participate, allocation Qi 2 (Z) prevails.
If Qi  Q, we call Q the status quo. The payo¤ from non-participation is then given by
U i(vi) =
X
z
Qzi 
z
i (vi)
where Qzi denotes the probability assigned to outcome z by Qi . Notice that non-participation payo¤s may
depend on is type.
The timing is as follows: at stage 0 the designer chooses mechanism (p; x). At stage 1 agents decide
whether to participate or not. If all participate, they report their types and the mechanism determines the
outcome of the negotiations and the payments. If agent i decides not to participate, the outcome of the
negotiations is Qi. If two or more decide not to participate, some arbitrary Q is implemented.
We now provide a formal denition of what it entails for a direct revelation mechanism to be feasible.
Denition 1 (Feasible Mechanisms) For given outside options fQigi2N , we say that a mechanism (p; x)
is feasible i¤ it satises:
(IC) Incentive Constraints
Ui(vi; vi; (p; x))  Ui(vi; v0i; (p; x)) for all vi; v0i 2 Vi and i 2 N
(VP) Voluntary Participation Constraints
Ui(vi; vi; (p; x))  U i(vi) for all vi 2 Vi, and i 2 N
(RES) Resource ConstraintsP
z2Z
pz(v) = 1; pz(v)  0 for all v 2 V
Summarizing, feasibility requires that p and x are such that (1) agents prefer to tell the truth about
their valuation parameter, (2) agents choose voluntarily to participate in the mechanism and (3) p is a
probability distribution over Z.
Our objective is to investigate what are the forces that enable the existence of feasible mechanisms that
are ex-post e¢ cient.
We say that an assignment rule p : V  ! (Z) is ex-post e¢ cient i¤ for all v 2 V , pz(v) > 0 implies
that z(v) 2 argmax
z02Z
NP
i=1
z
0
i (v)
Simply put, an ex-post e¢ cient assignment rule assigns positive probability only to outcomes that
maximize the sum of agentsutilities. Ties can be broken arbitrarily.
We say that a payment rule x : V  ! RN balances the budget i¤ P
i2N
xi(v) = 0 for all v 2 V .
Denition 2 A mechanism (p; x) is ex-post e¢ cient i¤ p is an ex-post e¢ cient assignment rule and x
balances the budget.
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We now proceed to a characterization of feasible ex-post e¢ cient mechanisms due to Schweizer (2006)
that relies on an earlier paper by Makowski and Mezzeti (1994). For that we need to introduce the concept
of the critical type of an agent. The critical type of agent i; vi is the type where his gains from trade are
minimal. Formally:
Denition 3 For a xed mechanism (p; x) the critical type of agent i is denoted by vi and is a type where
the di¤erence between participation and non-participation payo¤s are minimized:8
vi 2 argminvi [Ui(vi)  U i(vi)] : (1)
Schweizers (2006) characterization is based on the observation that the interim information rent of
an agent is identical for all incentive compatible and e¢ cient mechanisms. This follows from the revenue
equivalence theorem.9 A simple way to calculate the rent is to use a particular class of mechanisms that
satises these properties, namely the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves class (VCG).10
The total social surplus at an ex-post e¢ cient assignment rule is given by:
W (v) =
X
i2I

z(v)
i (vi);
where z(v) is an ex-post e¢ cient social alternative if the vector of types is v. Dening W (vi ; v i) =

z(vi ;v i)
i (v

i )+
P
j 6=i

z(vi ;v i)
j (vj), we can write the (interim) information rent of agent i in a VCG mechanism
as
Ui(vi)  Ui(vi ) = E[W (v) W (vi ; v i)]
Then, from the analysis of Schweizer (2006) we know that there exists a Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanism, that satises interim participation constraints, ex-post e¢ ciency and budget balance i¤
E[(v)] = E
264 W (v)| {z }
surplus
 
X
i2I
E[W (v) W (vi ; v i)]| {z }
info rents paid to agents
 
X
i2I
X
z2Z
Qzi 
z
i (vi)| {z }
outside payo¤s
375  0: (2)
Whenever critical types fvi gi2N are such (2) is true pointwise (and not only in expectation), then the
possibility result is strong in the following sense: for any distribution of types F that generates the critical
types fvi gi2I there exists a feasible and ex-post e¢ cient mechanism.
Now we employ this characterization to provide answers to the questions we posed in the introduction.
8 If there is more than one type satisfying this, any of them will do.
9See Krishna and Perry (2000) for a general version allowing for multi-dimensional types.
10This observation is also in Williams (1999) and in Krishna and Perry (2000). They establish that a mechanism is incentive
feasible and e¢ cient i¤ and only if is a generalized Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanisms.
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3. Multi-Asset Trading Mechanisms: Exclusive Ownership
This section studies whether including more assets in the negotiation can potentially solve the basic im-
possibility result pointed out by Myerson and Sattertwaite (1983). First, we analyze the case where a seller
owns multiple assets that are perceived as substitutes by both the seller and the buyer and show that simul-
taneous negotiation helps reduce ine¢ ciencies. The basic intuition is that the existence of substitutabilities
lessens the intensity of conict, and therefore could help to overcome the impossibility result. The e¤ect is
stronger when assets are heterogeneous, where even full e¢ ciency is sometimes possible. At the end of the
section we show that for goods that are complements (or neither complements nor substitutes) ine¢ ciencies
always prevail.
3.1 Homogeneous Assets
We rst consider a slight modication of the Myerson-Sattertwaite environment, where the seller owns
two11 homogeneous assets. Both the buyer and the seller derive decreasing marginal utility for them,
meaning that the extra utility from owning a second unit is lower than the rst. In this situation there
are three possible allocations: the seller keeps both assets (z1 = 2; 0), each agent ends up with one asset
(z2 = 1; 1) and the buyer obtains both assets (z3 = 0; 2). The payo¤s that accrue to the seller (indexed by
1) and the buyer (indexed by 2) are given by:
2;01 (v1) = (1 + )v1 
0;2
1 (v2) = 0
1;11 (v1) = v1 
1;1
1 (v2) = v2
0;21 (v1) = 0 
0;2
2 (v2) = (1 + )v2
where  2 (0; 1)12 captures the fact that these two assets are substitutes. The status quo is given by
allocation z1 = 2; 0 since the seller owns both assets, and vi is distributed according to Fi on [0; 1]:
Our rst result shows that decreasing marginal utility does not make the design of an ex-post e¢ cient
trade mechanism possible. This impossibility result is strong since it holds even if  is almost equal to
0, and therefore the conict of interest is minimal, because the ex-post e¢ cient allocation is z2 = 1; 1 for
almost all types.
Proposition 1 If  2 (0; 1) and the status quo is given by allocation z1 = 2; 0, then there is no ex-post
e¢ cient, incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that balances the budget irrespective of
the distributions of types F1; F2:
Proof. It is easy to see that v1 = 1 and v2 = 0. This is because, similar to Myerson and Satterwhaitte
(1983), the slope of the sellers payo¤ from non-participation is 1+, while the slope of his payo¤ from an
11The result does not change if the seller owns more goods.
12Notice that  = 0 implies that a second object gives no utility at all, and therefore the ex-post e¢ cient allocation is
constant and e¢ ciency is possible. On the other hand  = 1 corresponds to constant marginal utility and is equivalent to the
Myerson-Sattertwaite environment.
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ex-post e¢ cient assignment is weakly less than 1+ for all v1 2 [0; 1]: The slope of the buyers payo¤ from
non-participation is 0; and the slope of his payo¤ from an ex-post e¢ cient assignment is weakly greater
than 0 for all v2 2 [0; 1]:
Then, (v1; v2) from (2) reduces to
(v1; v2) =  W (v1; v2) +W (1; v2) +W (v1; 0)  (1 + )
=  maxf(1 + )v1; v1 + v2; (1 + )v2g
+maxf1 + ; 1 + v2g+ (1 + )v1   (1 + )
=  maxf(1 + )v1; v1 + v2; (1 + )v2g
+maxf; v2g+ (1 + )v1   :
If  > v2, the above expression reduces to
(v1; v2) =  maxf(1 + )v1; v1 + v2; (1 + )v2g+ (1 + )v1
which is equal to zero, whenever  maxf(1 +)v1; v1 + v2; (1 +)v2g+ (1+)v1 = (1+)v1; and strictly
negative otherwise.
If   v2, we have
(v1; v2) =  maxfv1 + v2; (1 + )v2g+ v2 + (1 + )v1   
=  maxfv1; v2g+ (1 + )v1   
 v1   
 0
Therefore (v1; v2)  0 for all v1; v2; and there is a region of types with a non-empty interior where
(v1; v2) < 0; establishing that it is impossible to design ex-post e¢ cient mechanisms.
From Proposition 1 we conclude that irrespective of the degree of substitutability of the two assets, it
is not possible to design an ex-post e¢ cient negotiation procedure. However, we can investigate how the
degree of substitutability of the two assets reduces these unavoidable ine¢ ciencies. As a measure of the
ine¢ ciency we use the amount of transfers that a broker should bring into the system in order to make
e¢ ciency possible . The higher the outside transfers needed, the higher the degree of ine¢ ciency. For the
case where v1 and v2 are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], some straightforward calculations, yield that the
expected decit as a function of  is given by
E[(v1; v2)] =
2
3
a2   5
6
a  1
6
a4:
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As one can see, the decit (the negative of the subsidy needed) is decreasing in , but it is 0 only when
 = 0. So substitutabilities help reduce the ine¢ ciency, but do not solve the problem unless the second
asset is of no use once an agent already owns the rst. We depict the ine¢ ciency in the next gure.
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As we can see, substitutability help but is not enough on its own to achieve e¢ ciency. We now examine
what happens when assets are heterogeneous.
3.2 Heterogeneous Assets
Suppose that two assets are at stake, A and B, and they are substitutes for the agents. The di¤erence with
the previous model is the heterogeneity of the assets: each asset is valued by an agent based on a di¤erent
information parameter (types are multidimensional). The payo¤s are given by: 13
AB;01 (v
A
1 ; v
B
1 ) = v
A
1 + v
B
1 
AB;0
2 (v
A
2 ; v
B
2 ) = 0
A;B1 (v
A
1 ; v
B
1 ) = v
A
1 
A;B
2 (v
A
2 ; v
B
2 ) = v
B
2
B;A1 (v
A
1 ; v
B
1 ) = v
B
1 
B;A
2 (v
A
2 ; v
B
2 ) = v
A
2
0;AB1 (v
A
1 ; v
B
1 ) = 0 
0;AB
2 (v
A
2 ; v
B
2 ) = v
A
2 + v
B
2
Here the result is strikingly di¤erent, since the general impossibility is no longer true.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the status quo is given by allocation (AB; 0); and that  2 (0; 1). There exist
distributions of types F1; F2 for which a feasible and ex-post e¢ cient mechanism exists.
13The same result is obtained if there is no ex-ante preference between the assets, and AB;0i (v
A
i ; v
B
i ) = maxfvAi ; vBi g +
minfvAi ; vBi g:
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Proof. It is easy to see that the critical types are again extreme and they are given by (vA1 ; v
B
1 ) = (1; 1)
and (vA2 ; v
B
2 ) = (0; 0). Then
(vA1 ; v
B
1 ; v
A
2 ; v
B
2 ) =  W (vA1 ; vB1 ; vA2 ; vB2 ) +W (1; 1; vA2 ; vB2 ) +W (vA1 ; vB1 ; 0; 0)  (1 + )
=  maxfvA1 + vB1 ; vA1 + vB2 ; vB1 + vA2 ; vA2 + vB2 g+maxf1 + ; 1 + vA1 ; 1 + vB1 g
+maxfvA1 + vB1 ; vB1 g   (1 + )
=  maxfvA1 + vB1 ; vA1 + vB2 ; vB1 + vA2 ; vA2 + vB2 g+maxf; vA1 ; vB1 g
+maxfvA1 + vB1 ; vB1 g   
We then notice that (vA1 ; v
B
1 ; v
A
2 ; v
B
2 ) is positive at least in the region where maxfvA1 ; vB1 g >  and
vA1 +v
B
1 > maxfvA1 + v; vB1 + vA2 ; vA2 + vB2 g. Therefore, if the distribution F1 puts enough weight on that
region, we have that e¢ cient dissolution is possible.
Remark 1 Notice that the possibility result is no longer true when  = 1, that is when assets stop being
substitutes, since in that case E((v)) < 0. This is addressed later in Proposition 6.
It is interesting to note that the above result depends on the initial ownership structure being (AB; 0).
If the ownership structure is (A;B), e¢ ciency is never possible. This is established next in Proposition 3
and it contradicts the conventional wisdom, that suggests that it is easier to achieve e¢ ciency if property
rights are more balanced in the sense that both agents own some part of the total endowment.
Proposition 3 If the status quo is given by allocation (A;B) then for any distribution of types, there is
no feasible and ex-post e¢ cient mechanism.
Proof. It is easy to see that the critical types for this status quo option are given by (vA1 ; v
B
1 ) = (1; 0) and
(vA2 ; v
B
2 ) = (0; 1). Then,
(vA1 ; v
B
1 ; v
A
2 ; v
B
2 ) =  W (vA1 ; vB1 ; vA2 ; vB2 ) +W (1; 0; vA2 ; v) +W (vA1 ; vB1 ; 0; 1)  2
=  maxfvA1 + vB1 ; vA1 + vB2 ; vB1 + vA2 ; vA2 + vB2 g+ (1 + vB2 ) + (1 + vA1 )  2
=  maxfvA1 + vB1 ; vA1 + vB2 ; vB1 + vA2 ; vA2 + vB2 g+ vA1 + vB2
 0;
and there is a region of types with a non-empty interior where (v1; v2) < 0.
This result completes our investigation of whether negotiating over multiple assets that are substitutes
helps achieve e¢ ciency. The main conclusion is that substitutabilities help but do not completely solve the
problem. If heterogeneity is added to the mix, though, e¢ cient trading becomes possible. Moreover, we
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nd a result that contradicts received wisdom: when ownership is more spread out in the sense that each
agent owns one good, e¢ ciency is impossible.
Our ndings suggest that teams would benet by putting many players on the table at the same
time, since these assets are usually substitutes. For example, a team overloaded with two or more star
forwards, knowing that 1 of them will have to be benched, should negotiating with other teams about
negotiate over both players at the same time. It is important to remark that even for substitutable assets,
separate negotiations will not achieve e¢ ciency. If, for instance, asset B were to be traded in the previous
environment, but with ownership of asset A xed, we would have the impossibility result again, even if the
marginal valuation of agent 1 is only v1A and for agent 2 is v
2
A.
As a conclusion to the section we briey examine the cases when goods are not substitutes.
3.3 Independent and Complementary Assets
If goods are independent (that is the total valuation of a package is additive on its components) the
results obtained for a single asset (impossibility in the case of extreme ownership and possibility for certain
property rights adequately chosen) carry over to multiple assets. These conclusions follow from Proposition
6, which we state and prove in the following section.
If goods are complements, it is not di¢ cult to see that ine¢ ciencies increase. The strengthening of
the conict (ex-post e¢ ciency indicates that assets are never shared in this case) just gives more force to
impossibility of achieving e¢ ciency. For the sake of completion we present the result:
Proposition 4 Consider the heterogeneous goods version of the model presented in the previous subsection
and assume  > 1. Then if one agent owns both assets there is no incentive compatible and ex-post e¢ cient
mechanism.
Proof. It is enough to notice that expression (2) for each v1; v2 becomes:
(v1; v2) =  W (vA1 ; vB1 ; vA2 ; vB2 ) +W (1; 1; vA2 ; vB2 ) +W (vA1 ; vB1 ; 0; 0)  (1 + )
=  maxfvA1 + vB1 ; vA2 + vB2 g+ 1 + + vA1 + vB1   (1 + )  0;
and there is a region of types with a non-empty interior where (v1; v2) < 0
This completes our investigation of whether simultaneous negotiations may reduce the ine¢ ciencies that
result from the presence of asymmetric information. This investigation has been performed assuming that
the ownership of assets is exclusive. Now we move on to examine cases where co-ownership is permitted.
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4. Trading Mechanisms with Co-ownership
In this section we study how property rights in partnerships a¤ect the existence of feasible and ex-post
e¢ cient mechanisms in a general model, where payo¤s and distributions of types can be asymmetric across
agents. A partnership consists of a group of individuals that jointly own a number of assets. In order to
focus on the ownership issue, we abstract from substitutabilities and complementarities. We rst examine
partnerships of one asset.
4.1 Co-ownership of One Asset
Agent i0s payo¤ from owning a fraction r of the asset is r  i(vi); for r > 0; and it is zero otherwise. The
partnership is characterized by the initial property rights, which are denoted by Q = (r1; :::; rN ). That is,
there is one object owned jointly (agent i owns a proportion ri) and each agent cares only about getting
the object or not.
An ex-post e¢ cient assignment p is one where for each v; the agent with the highest i(vi) is awarded
exclusive ownership of the asset. Then, the expected payo¤ for agent i when his valuation is vi at the
ex-post e¢ cient assignment, is
Ui(vi; vi; (p
; x)) =
Y
j2N
j 6=i
Fj(
 1
j (i(vi)))  i(vi) + Ev i [xi(vi; v i)]
and at the status quo Q = (r1; :::; rN ), his payo¤ is U i(vi) = ri  i(vi):
The seminal paper by Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) examines partnerships where agents
valuations are drawn from the same distribution and their valuations are given by i(vi) = vi. In that
context, they show that when the shares are close to ri = 1N , it is possible to nd a mechanism that is
feasible and ex-post e¢ cient. When compared to the result in Myerson and Sattertwaite (1983), the one
of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) may lead to the conclusion that what makes the existence of
ex-post e¢ cient mechanisms possible, is the equality in property rights.
Here, we allow for asymmetric type distributions and more general payo¤ functions and we nd that
feasible and ex-post e¢ cient mechanisms exist if all agents valuations from the asset evaluated at the
vector of critical types are equal:
Proposition 5 If property rights (r1; :::; rN ) are such that
i(v

i ) = j(v

j ); (3)
then there exists a feasible and ex-post e¢ cient mechanism. Moreover, suppose that for all i 2 I, i is
strictly increasing in vi, and they all have the same range (i(vi) = ; and i(vi) = ); then such property
rights always exist and the result remains true for property rights in a neighborhood of (r1; :::; rN ).
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Proof. 14From (2), we have it is possible to design an ex-post e¢ cient mechanism i¤
E
"
 (N   1)max
i2N
fi(vi)g+
X
i2N
maxfi(vi );  i(v i)g
#

X
i2N
ri  i(vi ): (4)
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition is that (4) holds for all vectors v, that is
 (N   1)max
i2N
fi(vi)g+
X
i2N
maxfi(vi );  i(v i)g 
X
i2N
ri  i(vi ): (5)
We just need to verify that (5) is satised whenever (3) is satised.
Suppose that for some vector of valuations vi we have that
k(vk) = max
i2N
fi(vi)g:
Then for this vector of valuations (5) reduces to
 (n  1)k(vk) + (n  1)k(vk) + maxfk(vk);  k(v k)g 
X
i2N
rii(v

i )
which is always true. Since this holds for any v (5) always holds.
Now we move on to establish that for any distributions Fi; i 2 N; there exists an initial ownership
structure (r1; :::; rN ) that guarantees that i(vi ) = j(v

j ) holds.
First note that at the critical types, it must be the case thatY
j2N
j 6=i
Fj(
 1
j (i(v

i )))
0
i(v

i ) = ri  0i(vi ): (6)
Dening Gi(s) =
Q
j2N
j 6=i
(Fj   1j )(s), and noticing that it is invertible (since it is increasing) (6) can be
rewritten as
i(v

i ) = G
 1
i (ri): (7)
Therefore, for i(vi ) = j(v

j ) to be true, we must have
Gi(G
 1
j (rj)) = ri (8)
which, for a given ri determines rj . Now, we only have to check the consistency requirement that
NP
1=1
ri = 1
so, for i = 1 and j = N (8) becomes
G 11 (r1) G 1N
 
1  r1  G2(G 11 (r1))  ::: GN 1(G 11 (r1))

= 0 (9)
14Our rst proof of the result , which we present in the Appendix, was more lengthy but has the advantage that it establishes
that the condition i(vi ) = j(v

j ) minimizes ine¢ ciencies. The proof now is shorter thanks to Y-K Che.
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Noticing that G 11 (0) G 1N (1) =  1 and G 11 (1) G 1N (0) = 1, continuity of G 11 implies the existence of
r1 2 (0; 1) such that (9) holds.
For the case where i(vi) = vi, (3) reduces to vi = v

j . If, moreover, all types are distributed according
to the same distribution F , we have that vi = v

j is satised if ri  1N , exactly as in Cramton, Gibbons
and Klemperer (1987). However, when distributions are asymmetric the property rights that guarantee
the condition in Proposition 5 can be extremely unequal:
Example 1 Consider a partnership with 2 players, i(vi) = vi, F1(v1) = vn1 and F2(v2) = v
1
n
2 . Then, it
is easy to see that v1 = F
 1
2 (r1) = r
n
1 and v

2 = F
 1
1 (r2) = r
1
n
2 . From Proposition 5 we know if v

1 = v

2
e¢ cient dissolution is possible. For this example this condition is equivalent to
rn1 = r
1
n
2 : (10)
Recalling that r1 + r2 = 1; (10) reduces to
rn1 = (1  r1)
1
n :
For n = 3 we obtain r1 = 0:8243 and r2 = 0:1757; which give us that v1 = v2 = 0:56009. Moreover, a
simple calculation shows that for these distributions, with property rights of ri = 12 there is no possibility
of e¢ cient dissolution. For n = 99, optimal property rights are even more extreme: r1 = 0:99926 and
r2 = 0:00074. For this case the corresponding critical types are v1 = v2 = 0:92933:
We can see that, for certain distributions, very extreme property rights are needed in order to have
e¢ cient dissolution of the partnership, quite contrary to the intuition one gets from the discussion of
symmetric environments. In fact, for the very extreme case of n = 99, property rights very close to (1; 0)
are needed. It is useful to contrast this result with the one in Myerson and Sattertwaite (1983), which shows
that (r1; r2) = (1; 0) will never allow an e¢ cient dissolution. In fact, our example shows that arbitrarily
close to extreme property rights can be needed for e¢ cient dissolution, but property rights that are extreme
will never allow it.
Moreover, this example suggests that agent 1, whose valuation is more likely to be higher, must own a
higher proportion of the good and viceversa. This turns out to be a general result with interesting economic
consequences:
Corollary 1 Lets suppose that F1   11 ()  F2   12 ()  :::  FN   1N ().15Then the property rights
that guarantee the possibility of e¢ cient dissolution satisfy r1  r2  :::rN .
15This is equivalent to the distributions of valuations being ordered according to FOSD (rst order stochastic dominance),
since Fi   1i (x) = P (i(vi)  x):
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Proof. We know that at the critical types
Q
j 6=i
Fj(
 1
j (i(v

i ))) = ri and that for the property rights that
guarantee dissolution we have (vi )  x. Therefore we have
ri =
Y
j 6=i
[Fj   1j ](x) = ri;
from which we obtain that
ri
rj
=
[Fj   1j ](x)
[Fi   1i ](x)
> 1:
Corollary 1 has important implications for many situations.
Professional Players: In the example we mentioned about Luis Jiménez, the problem lies exactly on
the symmetry of the property rights. Fiorentina, which had a much higher probability of high valuations
(playing in Serie A there is more at a stake) owned as many shares as Ternana, which had a much smaller
probability of high valuations. An asymmetric partnership would have been advisable, with Fiorentina
owning a signicantly higher amount of shares.
Joint-Ventures: The same could be said in general about other joint-ventures. Even if the participa-
tion of all associates is needed, Corollary 1 suggests that the ones likely to benet the most ex-post (for
example, the ones with more marketing muscle) should own bigger shares of the project. If this fails, it
may be impossible to nd a mechanism that transfers the control e¢ ciently to one of the participants.16
R&D and Firm Structure: It is well known that in many cases, rms that are better at generating
an invention are not necessarily the best ones at developing applications for it. A famous case is the one of
Research in Motion (RIM), the developer of Blackberry, who did not own the right for the technology, and
fought a costly litigation during more than 3 years with NTP. NTP owned the rights for the technology
but, being primarily a patent owning company, had no ability to directly develop products or prot from
the patents.17 Our result hints an explanation. To have e¢ cient trade, rms that are better at developing
applications (Fi biased toward high values of vi) should also have high probabilities of winning the research
race (higher ri). It also provides a rational for integration of research and production under one rm. When
research is conducted by independent laboratories, inventions have to bought in order to be developed.
The asymmetric information present in these transactions may lead to a break-down of the negotiations
and foregone prots.
We continue by noting that our ndings generalize straightforwardly to the case where a partnership
owns multiple assets: rms co-owning multiple plants, patents and copyrights, or a married couple that
seeks a divorce and owns multiple properties.
16For more on this see also Kuribko (2005) that examines dynamic partnerships.
17There is extensive press coverage for this lawsuit. For a sample see "Detractors of BlackBerry See Trouble Past Patents."
The New York Times, March 6, 2006.
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4.2 Co-ownership of Multiple Assets
Suppose now that there are N individuals who jointly own K assets and that agent is valuation of asset
k is given by ik(vki ) and his valuation of a subset of assets S 2 K is additive:
P
k2S
ik(v
k
i ) (so goods are
neither complements nor substitutes). The ownership share of asset k by agent i is denoted by rki , hence
in case of disagreement his payo¤ is given by
P
k2K
rki  ik(vki ).
In this context, exactly as in the case of single-asset partnerships, if property rights are extreme, there
is feasible and ex-post e¢ cient mechanisms. On the other hand, there always exist property rights that
guarantee the existence.
Proposition 6 Consider a multi-asset partnership where goods are neither complements nor substitutes.
Then
 If for every asset k there exists an agent i such that rik = 1 then there is no feasible and ex-post
e¢ cient mechanism.
 If the property rights are such that ik(vki ) = jk(vkj ) for all i; j 2 N; k 2 K then there exists a
feasible and ex-post e¢ cient mechanism.
 It is always possible to nd property rights such that ik(vki ) = jk(vjk) for all i; j 2 N; k 2 K.
Proof. For the rst and second points, it is enough to notice that expression (2) reduces to
E
"
 (N   1)
X
k2K
max
i2N
fik(vik)g+
X
k2K
X
i2N
maxfik(vki );  i;k(v i;k)g
#

X
k2K
X
i2N
ri  i(vki )
which in turns can be rewritten as
X
k2K
"
E
"
 (N   1)max
i2N
fik(vki )g+
X
i2N
maxfik(vki );  i;k(vk i)g
#
 
X
i2N
ri  i(vki )
#
 0
The expression inside the rst sum is pointwise non-negative for all k 2 K if ik(vki ) = jk(vkj ) for all
i; j 2 N . This can be immediately seen from the proof of Proposition 5, establishing the second point.
Moreover, if for all k 2 K there exists i 2 N such that rik = 1, the expression inside the rst sum
reduces to
 (N   1)max
j2N
jk(v
k
j ) +
X
j 6=i
maxf0;  j;k(vk j)g+ i;k(vki )  i;k(vki )
which is clearly non-positive everywhere and strictly negative for the region where max
i2N
j;k(v
k
j ) = i;k(v
k
i );
establishing the rst point.
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Finally, the existence of optimal property rights that guarantee the existence of feasible ex-post mech-
anisms mirrors again the proof in Proposition 5. In fact, the condition for critical types can be rewritten
as
Q
j 6=i
Fjk(
 1
jk (v
k
i )) = rik, where Fjk(x) =
R
Vj; k
xR
0
dFj(vj), and the analysis of Proposition 5 follows.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the forces that reduce the intensity of conict and help alleviate the ine¢ -
ciencies that arise from asymmetric information. We established under which circumstances there exists
negotiation procedures that are incentive compatible, induce agents to participate without coercion and at
the same time are ex-post e¢ cient and balance the budget. We rst showed that the simultaneous negotia-
tion over multiple assets (or issues) can be helpful if these assets are perceived as substitutes by the players.
This e¤ect is stronger, and sometimes eliminates ine¢ ciency altogether if the assets are heterogeneous.
We then investigated the role of initial property rights. We showed that in order to guarantee the
existence of ex-post e¢ cient mechanisms, property rights should be biased towards the agents with a
higher probability of having a high valuation of the good. Then we used these results to understand the
breakdown in negotiations where initial ownership is well balanced, and based on previous work one would
have expected ex-post e¢ cient trade to be possible. We also discussed implications for the design of joint
ventures and research partnerships.
6. Appendix
We show a di¤erent proof of Proposition 5 for the linear case of i(vi) = vi that highlights an important
feature of partnerships. Property rights (r1; :::; rN ) that guarantee vi  v not only allow for dissolution,
but they also maximize the sum of expected feasible transfers, therefore are the bestpossible property
rights. In order to obtain our characterization we will use Theorem 2 in Krishna and Perry (2000).
Proof. From the well known results in mechanism design (see for example Krishna and Perry 2000), we
have that almost surely the derivative of the payo¤ from participation is given by
dUi(vi)
dvi
= Ev i [p
zi(vi; v i)]
Using the fact that in an ex-post e¢ cient allocation pzi(vi; v i) = 1 if vi = max
j2N
vj and 0 otherwise, we get
that
18
dUi(vi)
dvi
= P (vi = max
j2N
vj)
=
Y
j 6=i
Fj(vi)
From (1) we then conclude that, for the interior critical types:
ri =
Y
j 6=i
Fj(v

i ):
From Krishna and Perry (2000), for a vector of critical types v we have
NX
i=1
xi(vjv) = [pi(vi ; v i)vi +
X
j 6=i
pj(v

i ; v i)vj ]  [
X
j 6=i
pj(vi; v i)vj ]  rivi :
We deneGi(s) =
Q
j 6=i
Fj(s), v1 i = maxj 6=i vj , SW (v

i ; v i) = pi(v

i ; v i)v

i+
P
j 6=i
pj(v

i ; v i)vj and SW i(v) =P
j 6=i
pj(vi; v i)vj . The proof consists of two steps
Step 1: We prove that
IX
i=1
E(xi(vjv)) =
X
i2InfIg
Z v
G 1i (ri)
sG
0
i(s)ds+
Z v
G 1I (1 i2InfIgri)
sG
0
i(s)ds 
IX
i=1
Z
V i
v1 iFi(v
1
 i)dF i(v i):
(11)
In fact, simple computations show that:
SW (vi ; v i)  SW i(v) =
8>>>><>>>>:
v1 i if vi > v
1
 i > v

i
vi if vi > v
1
 i and v

i > v
1
 i
vi   v1 i if vi < v1 i < vi
0 otherwise
:
Then , dening v^ i = fv i
v1 i < vi g we can write
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E(xi(vjv)) =
Z
v^ i

vi   v1 i

Fi(v
1
 i)dF i(v i) +
Z
v^ i
vi [1  Fi(v1 i)]dF i(v i)
+
Z
v^C i
v1 i[1  Fi(v1 i)]dF i(v i)  rivi
= vi
Z
v^ i
dF i(v i) 
Z
v^ i
v1 iFi(v
1
 i)dF i(v i)
+
Z
v^C i
v1 i[1  Fi(v1 i)]dF i(v i)  rivi
= vi
Z
v^ i
dF i(v i) 
Z
v i
v1 iFi(v
1
 i)dF i(v i)
+
Z
v^C i
v1 idF i(v i)  rivi
= vij 6=iFj(v

i ) 
Z
v i
v1 iFi(v
1
 i)dF i(v i) +
Z
v^C i
v1 idF i(v i)  rivi :
Now lets consider the term
R
v^C i
v1 idF i(v i). We have
Z
v^C i
v1 idF i(v i) = E

v1 i
v1 i  vi   P (v1 i  vi )
=
Z vi
vi
s
d(P (v1 i  s
v1 i  vi ))
ds
 P (v1 i  vi )
=
Z vi
vi
s
dj 6=iFj(s)
ds
where the last inequality comes from
P (v1 i  s
v1 i  vi ) = 1  P (v1 i  s v1 i  vi )
= 1  P (v
1
 i  s)
P (v1 i  vi )
= 1  1 j 6=iFj(s)
1 j 6=iFj(vi )
=
j 6=iFj(s) j 6=iFj(vi )
1 j 6=iFj(vi )
Therefore
d
ds
(P (v1 i  s
v1 i  vi )) = dj 6=iFj(s)ds 11 j 6=iFj(vi )
=
dj 6=iFj(s)
ds
1
P (v1 i  vi )
:
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With this, we go back to the expression of the expected payment, and we get
E(xi(v)) = v

ij 6=iFj(v

i ) 
Z
v i
v1 iFi(v
1
 i)dF i(v i)
+
Z vi
vi
s
dj 6=iFj(s)
ds
  vij 6=iFj(vi )
=
Z vi
vi
s
dj 6=iFj(s)
ds
 
Z
v i
v1 iFi(v
1
 i)dF i(v i)
=
Z vi
G 1i (ri)
sG
0
i(s)ds 
Z
v i
v1 iFi(v
1
 i)dF i(v i):
Summing over i we obtain (11).
Step 2: We maximize the surplus, taking as decision variables ri.
Maximizing with respect to ri we obtain:
 G 1i (ri)G
0
i(G
 1
i (ri))(G
 1
i )
0(ri) +G 1I (rI)G
0
I(G
 1
I (rI))(G
 1
I )
0(rI) = 0
Noticing that G
0
i(G
 1
i (ri))(G
 1
i )
0(ri) = 1, we get that G 1I (rI) = G
 1
i (ri), or equivalently v

I = v

i . Similarly
di¤erentiating with respect to the remaining r0is we obtain that
vi  v:
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